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THE THIRD-SHIFT PROBLEM IN CHINA: THE FIRST STEP IS ADMITTING 
YOU HAVE A PROBLEM 
 




 Death by Apple iPhone seems almost impossible yet on July, 11, 2013, it became 
the harsh reality for a twenty-three-year-old flight attendant from China’s Xinjiang 
region.2 Ma Ailun, a flight attendant for China Southern Airlines, was electrocuted after 
answering a call on her iPhone while it was charging.3  An investigation into Ma’s death 
revealed that Ma was not using an official Apple iPhone charger, but rather a counterfeit 
third-party charger. 4 In response to Ma’s death, Apple initiated a “USB Power Adapter 
Takeback Program” where customers could turn in third-party chargers at any Apple 
Retail Store or Apple Authorized Provider and purchase an official Apple charger for the 
discounted price of ten dollars. 5 While the program was initially aimed at American and 
Chinese Apple consumers, Apple eventually extended the program to a number of other 
countries, including Canada and the United Kingdom. 6  Ma’s untimely death and the 
events surrounding it were the headline for news outlets across the globe and would 
become an even bigger story when a similar incident was reported less than a week later. 
                                                 
1 “Paper tiger,”( 纸老虎 in simplified Chinese) is a Chinese metaphor that refers to a particular subject 
appearing strong, but in reality is weak or powerless. For more information on the history of the metaphor 
see Henry Yuhuai He, Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People’s Republic of China  649 (2001).  
2 Electrocution Death Blamed on Charging iPhone, CBCNews (Jul. 15, 2013), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/electrocution-death-blamed-on-charging-iphone-1.1313114. 
3 For the purposes of this Article, Chinese names are written with the family  name first.  
4 Sean Levinson, Woman Shocked To Death By Fake iPhone Charger Causes Apple To Reduce Charger 
Price, Elite Daily (July 6, 2013), http://elitedaily.com/news/technology/woman-shocked-to-death-by-fake-
iphone-charger-causes-apple-to-reduce-charger-price/. For discussion of what constitutes a counterfeit, see 
infra note 14-15.  
5 Id.  
6 Filip Truta, Apple Updated USB Power Adapter Takeback Program. Softpedia (August 13, 2013), 
http://news.softpedia.com/news/Apple-Updates-USB-Power-Adapter-Takeback-Program-375119.shtml. 
For full details of Apple’s program, see USB Power Adapter Tackback Program, APPLE (August 6, 2013). 
http://www.apple.com/support/usbadapter-takeback/.  
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The second incident involved thirty-year-old Wu Jian Tong of Beijing who got 
electrocuted while plugging his iPhone into the wall to charge.7 Wu was rushed to the 
hospital, with reports listing his last status as still being comatose ten days following the 
incident.8 As in Ma’s case, Wu was also using a counterfeit charger.  
 Ma and Wu are some of the latest victims of dangerous counterfeit products in the 
People’s Republic of China (China or PRC). In 2004 there was a major outbreak of 
counterfeit baby formula that cost the lives of at least fifty Chinese babies and caused the 
malnutrition of more than 100 of other Chinese babies. 9  Cases of actual harm is not 
limited to within China as evidenced by a recent seizure by United States Customs. In 
February 2013, five people and five New York-based companies were accused of 
importing hazardous and counterfeit toys from China to sell in the United States.10 The 
counterfeit toys were seized from shipping containers entering the United States from 
China on thirty-three separate occasions. 11  Seventeen of those seizures contained 
counterfeit toys with “excessive lead content and phthalate levels, small parts that 
presented choking and ingestion hazards, and easily accessible battery compartments.”12 
These cases demonstrate the danger that counterfeiting poses to both United States and 
Chinese citizens alike.13 
                                                 
7 Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Another Day, Another Round of iPhone Electrocution Headlines , CNN Money 
(July 19, 2013), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/07/19/apple-iphone-electrocution-charger/.  
8 Id.  
9 For details of the outbreak, see Jonathan Watts, Chinese Baby Milk Blamed for 50 Deaths, The Guardian 
(Apr. 20, 2004), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/21/china.jonathanwatts .  
10 Kristina Sgueglia, 5 Accused of Importing Counterfeit, Hazardous Toys, CNN (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/06/us/hazardous-toys/.  
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Although counterfeiting continues to be a global problem, this Article will focus on counterfeiting as it 
relates to the United States and China. The economic impact of intellectual property theft on American 
business is estimated to be approximately $250 billion annually.  see Laura C. Nastase, Made in China: 
How Chinese Counterfeits are Creating a National Security Nightmare for the United States, 19 Fordham 
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 143, 146 (2008). (citing Carlos M. Gutierrez, U.S. Sec’y of Commerce, 
 3 
 When discussing counterfeits there are three major categories that have 
emerged.14 The first category is just plainly referred to as a “counterfeit.”15 A counterfeit 
is a product that bears a trademark that its maker is unauthorized to use. 16 For example, a 
watchmaker from Texas who makes a watch and then puts the trademark Rolex on the 
back of it would have made a counterfeit. The second type of counterfeit is called a 
“knockoff.” Knockoffs are products that look like a branded product but do not actually 
bear an unauthorized trademark.17 Typically, a consumer will know they are purchasing a 
knockoff because of the “product’s low price relative to the authentic good, the lack of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Remarks at AdvaMed Annual Conference in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/SecretarySpeeches/PROD01 004164).  
14  This Article discusses the three main types of counterfeit products that have emerged in the literature 
relating to counterfeits. For a different variation of these counterfeit categories, see Barry Berman, 
Strategies to Detect and Reduce Counterfeiting Activity , Business Horizons, May-June 2008, at 191.  
15 When discussing counterfeit products it is important to keep in mind that any one counterfeit product can 
infringe a number of different intellectual property rights. Consequently, there are three dominant 
categories of intellectual property rights that are typically infringed domestically and globally. See World 
Customs Organization, Customs and IPR Report 2011  14 (2012), available at  
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2012/ july/~/media/B5259E0497CA4FDF8CD64EB88F5D6
CE7.ashx. Trademark infringement leads all other intellectual property rights, accounting for 91% of global 
counterfeiting cases.  Id. As such, this Article will focus discussion on counterfeiting involving trademark 
infringement in China.  A trademark is a “word, phrase, symbol or design, or a combination of words, 
phrases, symbols or designs, that identifies and distinguishes the source of the goods of one party from 
those of others.” United States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO), Trademark, Copyright or Patent?, 
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics/trade_defin.jsp (last visited on Mar. 13, 2014). The typical 
definition of trademark infringement is the “use by another of the same or a similar mark that violates the 
prior trademark rights of another in the jurisdiction where such use occurs.” Int’l Trademark Ass’n, Global 
Trademark Resources, Trademark Infringement, 
http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/TrademarkInfringement.aspx (last visited on Mar. 
19, 2014).  However it should be noted that the legal definition of what constitutes trademark infringement 
varies in every country. Patents and Copyrights are the two other intellectual property rights that are most 
commonly infringed both domestically and globally. For more information on patent infringement in  China 
see Timothey J. Malloy, Christopher V. Carani & Yufeng Ma, McAndrews Held & Malloy, What Every 
U.S. Corporation Should Know About China’s Patent Protection & Enforcement , http://www.mcandrews-
ip.com/files/article/china_patent_protection.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). For more information on 
copyright infringement in China see Natalie P. Stoianoff, The Influence of the WTO Over China’s 
Intellectual Property Regime, 34 Sydney L. Rev. 65, (2012). For more general information on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in China see Jianqiang Nie, The Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights in China (2006).  
16 Roger Parloff, Not Exactly Counterfeit, FORTUNE (April 26, 2006). 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/05/01/8375455/ .  
17 Parloff, supra note 16. The term “knockoff” has also been used to encompass counterfeits that bear an 
unauthorized trademark. Id.  
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traditional packaging, and/or the unusual distribution channel.”18 For purposes of clarity, 
“knockoffs” as referred to in this context does not include products that simply copy the 
design or style of another product.19 Although knockoffs in the counterfeit context may 
not contain an infringing trademark, it may infringe another intellectual property right, 
such copyright or patent. The third type of counterfeit is a “third-shift” counterfeit.20 A 
third-shift counterfeit is “an unauthorized product made by an authorized contractor.”21 
As such, third-shift counterfeits are often referred to as “not exactly counterfeit” or a 
“third-shift good.” 22Although all three categories of counterfeits pose problems for both 
the United States and China, this Article will focus on third-shift counterfeiting because it 
is essentially counterfeiting being done “right under the noses” of companies. As such, 
third-shift counterfeiting should be one of the first targets in reducing counterfeiting.   
 This Article examines third-shift counterfeiting in China and the attention that it 
has received from both the United States and China. In particular, the Article looks at 
United States companies that have outsourced the production of products to China. Part I 
of this article will analyze the current state of counterfeiting as it relates generally to the 
United States and China. Part II of the Article will explain the various dynamics of third-
shift counterfeiting. More specifically, this section will look at a case involving New 
Balance sneakers where the problem of third-shift counterfeiting was exemplified.23 Part 
                                                 
18 Berman, supra note 14. 
19 See People v. Rosenthal, No. 51738(U), 2003 WL 23962174, at 1 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Mar. 4, 2003) (while 
discussing New York law, noted that “while it is perfectly legal to sell merchandise that copies the design 
and style of a product often referred to as ‘knock-offs’ it is against the law to sell goods that bear a 
counterfeit trademark”).  
20 The “third-shift” is also referred to as the “midnight shift,” or the “ghost shift.” Parloff, supra note 14. 
This Article will refer to this type of counterfeiting as “third shift.” The resulting products of this type of 
counterfeiting will be referred to as both “third-shift counterfeits” and “third-shift products.” 
21 Parloff, supra note 14.  
22 Parloff, supra note 14. 
23 See infra note 65. 
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III of the Article explains why the United States and China can and need to make better 
efforts to help combat third-shift counterfeiting. Part IV of the Article discusses the 
pitfalls of solutions that have already been attempted to battle third-shift counterfeiting. 
Finally, Part V proposes the possible solution of a China implemented, and U.S. 
supported, whistleblower program to help incentivize the reporting of third-shift 
counterfeiting in China.   
I.  THE CURRENT STATE OF COUNTERFEITING BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND CHINA 
 China remains the primary source economy for counterfeit and pirated goods that 
enter the United States. 24  U.S. Customs and Border Protection reports that China 
represents seventy-two percent of all intellectual property rights (IPR) seizures.25 This 
represents an increase of 12.5 percent increase from Fiscal Year 2011 to Fiscal Year 
2012. Moreover, seizures of counterfeit goods from China and Hong Kong totaled an 
astonishing $1.1 billion, a 10.4 percent increase from 2011. 26  Additionally, China 
remains on the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Priority Watch List for 
2013.27 China’s government reports that in 2011 Chinese Customs seized approximately 
ten billion infringing goods valued at approximately RMB 50 billion or $790 million.28  
Of these Chinese seizures, ninety-four percent of the infringing goods involved trademark 
                                                 
24 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Int’l Trade, Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 
2012 Seizure Statistics 11 (2012), available at 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FY2012%20IPR%20Seizure%20Statistics_0.pdf.  
25 Id. This statistic is based off of the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) of the seizures.  
26 Id. This statistic is based off of MSRP.  
27 United States Trade Representative (USTR), 2013 Special 301 Report 31 (2013). The USTR analyzes the 
IPR protection and enforcement of the ninety-five trading partners of the United States. The USTR then 
uses that information to compile a list of countries that are of most concern in regards to IPR protection and 
enforcement. 
28 Letter from the Int’l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., Inc. to Stanford McCoy, Assistant U.S. Trade 
Representative for Intellectual Property and Innovation, (Feb. 8, 2013) available at 
http://www.iacc.org/assets/2013_iacc_special_301_final_.pdf [hereinafter IACC letter]. 
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violations. 29 In addition, China’s Administration for Industry and Commerce (AIC) 
reports that in 2011 the AIC handled 79,021 trademark violation cases, of which 68,836 
were trademark infringement cases. 30  Of these trademark infringement cases, 17,022 
were foreign related, with the AIC collecting and eliminating 11,8022 million illegal 
trademark labels.31  
 These figures show that counterfeiting in China continues to be rampant. Many 
would assume that better intellectual property rights laws would help stop the 
counterfeiting in China; however, it is not China’s IPR laws that is the problem, it is the 
enforcement of those laws. China’s trademark laws are actually quite comprehensive as 
written down. For example, Article 52 of the Trademark Law of the PRC lays out what 
constitutes infringement of the exclusive right to use a registered trademark. 32 In order for 
these intellectual property laws to have teeth China has to make better efforts to enforce 
them. Although China has made some strides in retroactively targeting counterfeiting (i.e. 
seizures of counterfeit products), China has not made a valiant effort to proactively 
                                                 
29 Id.  
30 Bd. of State Admin. for Indus. and Commerce (AIC), People’s Republic of China, Annual Development 
Report on China’s Trademark Strategy 2011 at 19 (2011).  
31 Id. The language of the AIC report indicates that the number of illegal trademark labels collected and 
eliminated was an astounding 118,022,000,000—that is over 100 billion! 
32 Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 52 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., effective October 27, 2001), 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/sbjenglish/flfg1_1/flfg/201012/t20101227_103092.html (China). Article 52 states:  
 
Any of the following acts shall be an infringement of the exclusive right to use a registered trademark:     
(1) to use a trademark that is identical with or similar to a registered trademark in respect of the 
identical or similar goods without the authorization from the trademark registrant;  
(2) to sell goods that he knows bear a counterfeited registered trademark;      
(3) to counterfeit, or to make, without authorization, representations of a registered trademark of 
another person, or to sell such representations of a registered trademark as were counterfe ited, or 
made without authorization;     
(4)  to replace, without the consent of the trademark registrant, its or his registered trademark and 
market again the goods bearing the replaced trademark; or    
(5)  to cause, in other respects, prejudice to the exclusive right of another person to use a registered 
trademark.  
 
Trademark Law art. 52 
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minimize counterfeiting (i.e. closing down factories that produce counterfeits). The next 
section will describe how enforcement of intellectual property rights usually plays out in 
China, using trademark rights as the example.  
Enforcing Trademark Rights in China 
 In order to bring a claim for trademark infringement in China the trademark must 
be registered. 33  If a trademark is registered, there are three main mechanisms for 
enforcement. The first and most common mechanism for enforcement is administrative 
action. 34  “Those who take the administrative route are almost exclusively Chinese.”35 
Throughout the provinces and in some cities, are the local Chinese government agencies 
that operate as a “quasi-judicial authority.”36 These agencies that deal with infringement 
include the Intellectual Property Offices (IPOs), the AICs, the Copyright Office, and the 
Quality and Technical Supervision Bureaus (QTSBs) (local divisions of the 
Administration for Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine).37 The AIC is most 
likely to handle a complaint of trademark infringement. If the agency is satisfied with a 
                                                 
33 See Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 51 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., effective October 27, 2001), 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/sbjenglish/flfg1_1/flfg/201012/t20101227_103092.html (China). Article 51 states 
that “the exclusive right to use a registered trademark is limited to the trademark which h as been approved 
for registration and to the goods in respect of which the use of the trademark has been approved.” Id.  
34 Alan Cox & Kristina Sepetys, Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Litigation, Economic 
Damages, and Case Strategies, in Economic Approaches to Intellectual Property: Policy, Litigation and 
Management 11.401, 11.402 (Gregory K. Leonard and Lauren J. Stiroh eds., 2005) available at 
http://nera.myowg.com/extImage/PUB_IPR_Protection_China_IP1138.pdf.  
35 Thomas I. Ross, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in China , China Business Review (Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/enforcing-intellectual-property-rights-in-china/ [hereinafter Ross]. 
36 Ross, supra note 35. 
37 China Intellectual Property Rights in Small and Medium Enterprises Helpdesk, Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights in China 1, 1 (2013), http://www.china-
iprhelpdesk.eu/docs/publications/EN_Enforcement_Aug-2013.pdf [hereinafter China IPR SME Helpdesk]. 
China IPR SME Helpdesk is a project funded by the European Commission’s Directorate -General for 
Enterprise and Industry under the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP). China 
IPR SME Helpdesk objective is to assist small and medium sized European Union enterprises protect and 
enforce their IPR in or relating to China. Id. Currently, China IPR SME Helpdesk has eight offices in 
China. 
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trademark owner’s complaint they will investigate.38 Next, if the administrative agency 
does find trademark infringement, it has the authority to take actions against the 
infringing company. 39 The primary powers the agencies collectively have are the 
following: 1) raid an infringing company’s premises and seize and destroy infringing 
product 2) grant an injunction to make an infringing company desist and 3) fine an 
infringing company for the infringement. 40  However, a U.S. company is usually at a 
disadvantage because these agencies are localized. “Many counterfeiters have 
successfully bribed or otherwise coopted local officials into allowing them to continue to 
operate.” 41  Additionally, since counterfeiters sometimes account for the largest 
employers in some Chinese cities, the local agency may be reluctant to shutdown 
factories.42 Another downside of taking the administrative route is that agency officials 
do not have the authority to award monetary damages. 43  A last disadvantage of 
administrative action is that there is no established appeal procedure. 44  Thus, if a 
trademark owner is dissatisfied with the agency’s decision, it has to take case to court, 
which leads to the second enforcement mechanism.45 
 The second enforcement mechanism is judicial enforcement. Through civil 
litigation a trademark owner can seek injunctions, damages, and/or the surrendering and 
                                                 
38 Ross, supra note 35. 
39 China IPR SME Helpdesk, supra note 37, at 2. 
40 Id.  
41 Mark Turnage, A Mind-Blowing Number of Counterfeit Good Come from China, Business Insider (Jun. 
25, 2013, 10:28 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/most-counterfeit-goods-are-from-china-2013-6.  
42 Id.  
43 Ross, supra note 35. Although an administrative agency cannot award compensation to an IPR holder, it 
can impose costs on the infringer for its acts of infringement. Kristina Sepetys and Alan Cox, Intellectual 
Property Rights Protection in China: Trends in Litigation and Economic Damages, NERA Economic 
Consulting 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.nera.com/extImage/PUB_IPR_Protection_China_0109_final.pdf [hereinafter Sepetys & Cox, 
NERA]. It should be noted that information regarding administrative actions is not typically made public, 
making it difficult to assess their effectiveness. Id.  
44 Ross, supra note 35. 
45 Id. 
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destruction of tools/products.46 Once a complaint is filed, the time to trial is usually less 
than a year.47 After the accused infringer submits a timely answer, the court will usually 
give the parties a couple of months to submit their evidence in preparation for the trial.48 
However, “there is no discovery procedure, as there is in the United States, whereby 
revealing documents are produced, and development, sales, and profit information are 
revealed to the lawyers for the opposing party.”49 Although the use of damages experts is 
permitted by law for both parties, it generally does not occur.50 Thus, actual damages for 
infringement are difficult to determine because of the lack of evidence. 51 In the case of 
trademark infringement, statutory damages are adopted in most cases. 52 Under the current 
trademark statute, the maximum amount of damages is approximately RMB 500, 000 
(approximately USD 80,000).53  
 The actual trial “consists of opening statements by the parties, a court-conducted 
investigation of the evidence and witnesses, a debate usually under questioning by the 
court, and brief closing statements.”54 However, it is important to note that a trial for 
infringement in China “is usually preceded and followed by settlement negotiations 
                                                 
46 China IPR SME Helpdesk, supra note 37, at 3. 




51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 56 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., effective October 27, 2001), 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/sbjenglish/flfg1_1/flfg/201012/t20101227_103092.html (China). Article 56 states: 
“Where it is difficult to determine the profit that the infringer has earned because of the infringement in the 
period of the infringement or the injury that the infringee has suffered from the infringement in the period 
of the infringement, the People's Court shall impose an amount of damages of no more than RMB 500, 000 
yuan according to the circumstances of the infringement.” Id.  
54 Ross, supra note 35. 
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mediated by the judge.”55 If both parties cannot agree upon a settlement then the “judge 
will retire to consider his decision and will hand down a judgment in due course.”56 
 The third enforcement mechanism is to subject intellectual property violations to 
criminal sanctions. Recently there has been a dramatic increase in the number of criminal 
cases involving intellectual property. The 2012 White Paper reports that Chinese courts 
handled 13,104 IPR-related criminal cases, up 130 percent year-on-year. 57  In such 
criminal cases, the PRC government has the option to subject IPR violators to harsh 
punishments.58 Although rare, such prosecutions do take place as evidenced by the case 
of Xiao Zhenjiang. 59  In 2012, Xiao was sentenced to life in prison for counterfeiting 
Hermès bags.60 The apparent basis for Xiao’s sentence was violation of Article 140 of the 
Criminal Law, “which criminalizes Producing and Marketing Fake or Substandard 
Commodities and calculates the length of sentence based on the estimated value of the 
goods.” 61  Nevertheless, the extent to which the PRC actually uses crimina l law to 
prosecute IPR violations remains relatively infrequent.62  
U.S. companies that fall victim to infringement in China typically will not pursue 
any of the aforementioned mechanisms of enforcement. Many believe that U.S. 
companies are discouraged from filing meritorious lawsuits because of the small 
                                                 
55 China IPR Helpdesk, supra note 37 at 3. 
56 Id. There is no specific time frame attached to when a judge has to hand down the decision. For more 
discussion on judicial enforcement see Sepetys & Cox, NERA, supra note 43. 
57 See China Issues White Paper on Intellectual Property Protection , CHINA BRIEFING (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/04/29/china-issues-white-paper-on-intellectual-property-
protection.html. 
58 Margaret K. Lewis, Criminal Law Pays: Penal Law’s Contribution to China’s Economic Development , 
47 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (forthcoming 2014).   
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
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compensation that is awarded in comparison to their losses. 63 In addition, “high criminal 
thresholds, as well as difficulties in initiating or transferring cases for criminal 
prosecutions” result in limited deterrence. 64  Nevertheless, U.S. companies that do 
business in China still, although, rarely, pursue infringers of their intellectual property 
rights. In the next section, this Article will discuss third-shift practices in China and the 
U.S company of New Balance that actually attempted to use judicial mechanism of 
enforcement in China. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF THE THIRD-SHIFT 
 In order to understand the problem of the third-shift we must first examine the 
environment of which it is allowed to thrive in. This section will describe the 
circumstances that lead to third-shift problems, beginning with a discussion on 
outsourcing to China. Secondly, this section will describe the actual problem of the third-
shift. Lastly, this section will discuss two of the few, if not only, publicized cases of 
apparent third-shift production in China.  
Outsourcing to China 
 For the last two decades, U.S. companies have used outsourcing as a means of 
driving down the prices of consumer goods.65 Outsourcing occurs when a company for 
instance a U.S. company, chooses to employ a company in a country with cheaper 
production costs to manufacture the company’s products. 66  U.S. companies typically 
outsource the manufacturing of products to avoid the high wages and costs of producing 
                                                 
63 Sepetys & Cox, NERA, supra note 43 at 2.  
64 Id.  
65 Tim Phillips, Knockoff: The Deadly Trade In Counterfeit Goods 25 (2005).  
66 Id.  
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in the United States.67 U.S. companies will often outsource the manufacturing of products 
to countries like China, where production can be done very cheaply because of low 
wages, labor abundance, and few health and safety regulations.68  
 Outsourcing to a company in China begins with a U.S. company entering into a 
licensing agreement with a Chinese manufacturer—often called an Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) company.69 The U.S. company will grant the OEM a license to 
manufacture a specific number of products.70 The U.S. company entrusts the OEM with 
the company’s intellectual property rights in order to enable the OEM to make the 
company’s products. It is from this relationship that the problem of the third-shift 
emerges. Say the U.S. company of NIKE orders 100,000 sneakers from its Chinese OEM. 
The OEM fills the order from NIKE during its two eight-hour day shifts but then runs off 
20,000 additional sneakers during a “third-shift” at night.71 Often times the OEM will use 
inferior materials to make the third-shift counterfeit products.72  
Third-shift products will usually look like the authentic product because both 
products (the third-shift product and the authentic product) were manufactured using the 
same machines.73 However, although the two products may look the same, the third-shift 
product is usually of a lower standard, which can become very dangerous for 
                                                 
67 Id.  
68 Michele Nash-Hoff, Viewpoint: Why is China Cheaper? , INDUSTRY WEEK (Aug. 18, 2011). 
http://www.industryweek.com/environment/viewpoint-why-china-cheaper.  
69 Dan Harris, Not Exactly Counterfeit—New Balance Shoes and China’s “Third Shift ,” China Law Blog 
(May 1, 2006), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2006/05/not_exactly_counterfeit_new_ba.html .  
70 Phillips, supra note 65, at 26 
71 The OEM owner essentially turns the factory into a twenty-four hour operation, with the unofficial extra 
shift using shoddy materials, unofficial labor, and safety shortcuts. Phillips, supra note 65 at 26. 
72 Parloff, supra note 16. 
73 Phillips, supra note 65, at 26. 
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consumers.74 Once the OEM has produced the third-shift products, the OEM will both 
figuratively and literally sell the third-shift counterfeits out the back door.75 Alternatively, 
an OEM may choose to sell the “night shift” to a counterfeiter.76 Nevertheless, an OEM 
stands to make a huge profit by solely producing and selling third-shift counterfeits for 
itself.77 The OEM can make a large profit because of the use of cheap materials and labor 
and also because the OEM avoids paying the U.S. company a licensing fee.78  
 The relationship between a U.S. company and an OEM is referred to as a “self-
reporting relationship.” 79 The relationship is “self- reporting” because the OEM “declares 
how many products it made and pays a licensing fee to the [U.S.] company based on that 
figure.”80 The opportunity to provide false figures is apparent, as the OEM is the only one 
reporting how much product the OEM is producing. The global accountancy firm of 
KPMG found that the self-reporting economy is worth approximately $500 billion “but, 
when it surveyed 11 companies that used outsourcing as a way of manufacturing 
products, 70 percent of the relationships produced reporting errors.”81 Of the cases that 
produced errors, some were simple accounting errors, but other cases were because the 
OEM lied in its self-reporting, just so the OEM could pay less in licensing fees.82 
Third-shift Production 
                                                 
74 Id. Typically, an OEM that is producing third-shift goods will use either inferior material to make the 
third-shift goods or alternately use scrap material from the production of authentic goods. Harris, supra 
note 69. 
75 Phillips, supra note 65, at 26. 
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 Third-shift production has become such a severe problem that many U.S. 
companies cannot tell whether an unauthorized product is just a typical counterfeit (i.e. a 
product bearing a trademark that its maker was unauthorized to use) or if the 
unauthorized product was created during a third-shift.83 This was illustrated by the case 
of Too Inc. v. TJX Cos.84 In Too Inc. v. TJX Cos. Too Inc., which operates the Limited 
Too chain of girl clothing stores, learned that discount store TJ Maxx was selling thirty-
one different styles of Limited Too clothing at markdowns (653,000 garments in total). 85 
However, TJ Maxx was stocking more units of the garments than was ever ordered by 
Too Inc. from its Asian suppliers, (a majority of which are located in Hong Kong).86 In 
addition, the garments that Too Inc. did order were still being sold in Too’s stores.87 Too 
Inc. ended up suing TJ Maxx for trademark infringement in the Southern District of Ohio 
in order to stop the sales.88 During the suit, the lawyers for Too Inc. admitted that they 
were unsure of whether the garments were a typical counterfeit or whether the garments 
were a product of a third-shift.89  
The distinction between an unauthorized product being a counterfeit or a third-
shift product comes into play when a judge has to decide if the court should enjoin the 
sales. Judges can enjoin discounters under the Lanham Act from selling counterfeits, but 
some judges will let discounters sell third-shift goods because of the view that third-shift 
goods are “legally genuine.”90 However, the judge in the Too Inc. case found that even 
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84 Too, Inc. v. TJX Cos., 229 F. Supp. 2d 825 (S.D. Ohio 2002). 
85 Donald E. deKieffer, Underground Economies and Illegal Imports 14 (2010).  
86 Id.  
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90 Id. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 (2014).  
 15 
third-shift goods were a form of trademark infringement and thus enjoined the sales.91  
Although the Too Inc. case highlights how the issue of third-shift goods can come before 
a court in the United States, it does not illustrate how the problem is handled from the 
point of view of where the third-shift good was actually produced. For a better 
understanding of that we look to the case of New Balance shoes.  
New Balance Shoes 
 The case of New Balance shoes differs slightly from the typical third-shift 
production scenario. The New Balance case demonstrates what happens when a U.S. 
company terminates its contract with an OEM in China and that OEM does not stop 
production.  
New Balance shoes began outsourcing to China in the 1990s. 92  As of 2006, 
seventy percent of New Balance shoes were made in China by OEMs.93 One of New 
Balance’s OEM use to be a man named Horace Chang, who owned a factory in Yang 
Jiang City.94 Initially, Chang made New Balance shoes only for export, but in 1995, at 
Chang’s request, New Balance licensed him to also distribute the shoes in the Chinese 
market. 95  Following modest initial sales, Chang found success selling an inexpensive 
New Balance style known as the “Classic.” 96  The “Classic” shoe is described as a 
“colorful fashion shoe” with no midsole engineering, which is typically found in high-
performance shoes.97  
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In June 1999, Chang met with New Balance executives and announced that he 
projected sales of 250,000 in China for the “Classic” shoe.98 Although shocked by this 
figure, New Balance executives became fearful that the New Balance brand was 
becoming associated in China with a fashion shoes instead of a performance brand.99 
Consequently, New Balance told Chang to stop selling the “Classics.” 100  However, 
Chang did not stop, instead he ordered material to produce 450,000 pairs of the shoe. 101  
In August 2009, New Balance terminated Chang’s license to make and distribute 
the “Classics.” 102  Upon termination, the contract required Chang “to return to New 
Balance all its confidential technical, production, sales, and marketing information, 
including molds, specifications, signs, labels, packages, wrappers, and ads.” 103 However, 
Chang did not and instead continued to sell the shoes, and even tried to sell the shoes 
outside of the country.104 
 To help stop the bleeding, New Balance made a request to the provincial divisions 
of China’s AIC to seize the unauthorized shoes from Chang’s factory. The AIC did seize 
about 100,000 pairs of Chang’s shoes from his stores and factories. 105 The shock to New 
Balance would not be the amount of shoes that was seized from Chang, but instead would 
be the discovery that Chang “had launched a competing line of classic-style sneakers 





102 Id.The termination was effective December 31, 1999. New Balance’s sourcing department made the 
discovery that Chang was still producing because of his large order for materials to produce the 
unauthorized sneakers. Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. New Balance is unsure whether Chang continued to product the “Classics” after 1999 or if he was 
just selling stockpiled inventory. Id. 
105 Id. 
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under his own brand.”106 Chang’s own shoe brand was called “Henkees” and had a logo 
on the saddle of the shoe that appeared to be a distorted “Hi.” 107 The “Hi” on the shoe 
looked very similar to New Balance’s block N saddle sign. 108  New Balance had an 
arbitration clause in its contract with Chang, with all disputes to be heard by an 
international arbitrator applying Massachusetts law.109  
Although the international arbitrator did assess the damages of New Balance’s 
case, it could not provide an injunction for Chang to stop selling the New Balance 
“Classics.”110 Thus, in 2000 New Balance sued in Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court 
in order to obtain an injunction.  In February 2002, the Shenzhen court found in favor of 
Chang—“[T]he court found that while New Balance had terminated its licenses with 
Chang’s Hong Kong operating company, it had failed to do so with respect to Chang’s 
Yang Jiang factory.”111 The court also found that the Yang Jiang’ factory’s license to 
make the shoes, carried an implied license to distribute the shoes without having to pay 
any royalties.112 This came as a complete shock to New Balance since New Balance had 
never licensed the Yang Jiang factory to distribute New Balance shoes.113 
Following Chang’s victory, the lawyers for New Balance appealed to the 
Provincial High Court. The High Court heard the case in 2002 and it was months before 
New Balance heard any word on the Court’s decision. New Balance was notified through 
two intermediaries that New Balance could have the courts decision for the hefty price of 










$300,000. 114 In September 2003, after multiple monetary requests through intermediaries 
for the lead judge on the three-judge panel for the case, and after several New Balance 
rejections of such requests, New Balance reported the corrupt practices to the province’s 
supervisory bureau for courts.115 In April 2004, following a request by New Balance, the 
lead judge was replaced.116 Finally, in January 2005, the Guangdong High Court made its 
ruling, affirming in favor of Chang.117 New Balance was completely dissatisfied by the 
decision and thus petitioned for a rehearing in spring 2006. 118  As of May 2006 the 
rehearing had not taken place. Nevertheless, estimating New Balance’s damages under 
United States standards does not have to be estimated as New Balance’s international 
arbitrator awarded New Balance $9.9 million in damages.119  
Following the incident with Chang, New Balance implemented a number of 
protective measures for future dealings with OEMs. New Balance is now more vigilant in 
monitoring its supply chain—researching and checking out OEMs in advance.120 New 
Balance has since reduced the number of OEMs it does business with in China. 121 In 
addition, New Balance includes stringent audit clauses in their contracts with OEMs and 
enforces those clauses. 122  Lastly, New Balance now embeds encrypted information in 
                                                 
114 Id. The intermediaries were the mouthpieces of the lead judge on the case who wanted New Balance to 
pay the judge in order to get the Court’s decision. Id. 
115 Id. Although it appears that the lead judge handling the New Balance case was in fact corrupt, there is 
also what is sometimes referred to as “false corruption” in China. Essentially “false corruption” is when a 
intermediary claims to be seeking money on the behalf of a Chinese judge, but really that intermediary is 






121 Berman, supra note 14 at 196. 
122 Parloff, supra note 16. 
 19 
security tags in its shoes and monitors the amount of tags it issues to help battle third-
shifts.123  
The case of New Balance shows the importance of managing and controlling both 
OEMs and intellectual property rights in China. U.S. companies cannot keep treating 
counterfeiting as a so-called “soft crime” or “cost of doing business” because while 
counterfeiting increases, consumers’ faith in U.S. companies can potentially decrease. In 
the next section this Article will discuss the importance of battling third-shift 
counterfeiting. 
III. WHY THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA NEED TO MAKE BETTER 
EFFORTS TO BATTLE THIRD-SHIFT COUNTERFEITING 
 The problem of the third-shift exists and both the United States and China need to 
make better attempts to solve the problem in order to calm increasing concerns 
surrounding counterfeits and restore confidence in the consumer goods market.  
Typically, U.S. companies will not admit to having experienced third-shift activity.124 
U.S. companies usually do not admit to the third-shift problem because it essentially 
gives off the appearance that the U.S. company did not conduct sufficient due 
diligence. 125  Remember, the third-shift problem is created by people that the U.S. 
company hired, and thus the U.S. company could suffer bad press or be looked at as 
untrustworthy to consumers. When the New Balance case came to light, other U.S. 
companies that do business with OEMs in China were asked about the issue—of those 
companies many declined to discuss the issue or denied ever experiencing the issue.126 
                                                 





Moreover, even if a U.S. company does experience a third-shift problem, the U.S. 
company will usually choose not to litigate in Chinese courts. 127 The main reason for 
choosing not to litigate is because doing so would publicize the U.S. company’s failure to 
do sufficient due diligence and also because the U.S. company does not want to alienate 
local Chinese officials with whom the U.S. company deals with. 128  Additionally, as 
discussed earlier, U.S. companies may feel as though pursuing infringers is just not 
financially worth it due to low damage awards.  
 Nevertheless, the secret of the third-shift is “out,” and the United States and China 
need to admit it is a problem and start taking steps to combat the problem. Third-shift 
goods, like any other counterfeit, pose a huge risk to both consumers and companies 
alike. Consumers deserve to feel confident when they purchase a product that it is 
authentic and safe to use. U.S. companies that outsource to China must make better 
efforts to combat third-shifts because their reputation depends on providing such 
authentic and safe products. In the next section, this Article will discuss the pitfalls of 
attempted solutions to battle third-shifts. 
IV. PITFALLS OF ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS TO BATTLE THIRD-SHIFTS 
 When trying to find a solution to target the third-shift problem, there have been a 
number of attempted solutions. The first attempted solution has been for U.S. companies 
to provide OEMs with “one or more discrete components of a product such as a sew-on 
label.”129 The idea here is that the U.S. company will closely control the distribution of 
the such components and each component will contain track-trace technology (in most 
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cases covertly).130 The component that the U.S. company chooses becomes a “control 
component,” meaning that the U.S. company provides to the OEM only enough tracking 
components to fill the U.S. company’s order of the OEM produced goods. 131 
Consequently, if an OEM decides to run a third-shift and includes fake “control 
components” in the final third-shift product, the U.S. company will easily be able to 
detect the fake “control component.” 132  Although the U.S. company can detect a 
counterfeit product because of the presence of a fake control component, this attempted 
solution does not remedy the production of the counterfeit in the first place. This sort of 
remedy would be beneficial in cases like Too, Inc., where the means of production of the 
unauthorized garments was unclear. However, the case of Too, Inc., came after hundreds 
of thousands of unauthorized garments already entered into the United States and into a 
discount store. The goal of remedying third-shift production should be just that—
remedying the production.  
 A second attempted solution to address the problem of the third-shift has been to 
closely monitor OEMs. Similar to what New Balance did, this solution includes multiple 
subparts. In monitoring OEMs a U.S. company would implement the following 
procedures: (1) choose OEMs who have a history of being honest producers; (2) conduct 
surprise inspections of the OEM’s factories; (3) make sure the OEM returns all 
confidential information and intellectual property information upon termination of the 
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contract with the OEM; and (4) use multiple OEMs for the same product so that one 
OEM does not have enough information to copy a U.S. company’s good.133  
Choosing an OEM that has an honest history seems like a fairly simple solution. 
However, if third-shifts often go undetected how would a U.S. company really know that 
an OEM is truly an honest producer?  In addition, an OEM can falsify records since the 
OEM essentially is in charge of its own doings in China.  
Secondly, although surprise inspections could reveal third-shift practices, an 
OEM still has essentially home-court advantage. More specifically, an OEM can hide all 
third-shift products so that when, and if an inspector comes, the third-shift goods are 
hidden and out of sight.134 In addition, an OEM can claim that suspiciously third-shift 
goods are actually “factory overruns,” the so-called “oops, we made a few too many” 
goods.135 Lastly, sending someone to China to conduct surprise inspections may become 
costly for a company. 
Thirdly, ensuring that OEMs return confidential information and intellectual 
property rights seems like an obvious solution, but as demonstrated by the New Balance 
case, it is extremely difficult in practice. Essentially once a U.S. company outsources, it 
gives the OEM the specifications and blueprints to make the U.S. company’s product.136 
It is comparable to the posting of an unwanted image on the Internet. Once an image is 
posted online it is open to be seen by the world. Although the post can eventually be 
taken down, it cannot be erased from those who already have seen it, saved it, or copied 
it. Often times an OEM will take a U.S. company’s information and blueprints to a 
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factory down the road (typically owned by a relative) in the same county, and in no time 
there are counterfeits of the U.S. company’s product throughout the county. 137  In 
addition, once a U.S. company shuts down production in a factory in China, the same 
factory will spring back up a few months later, making counterfeit products. 138  The 
resurrected factory owner already knows where to buy the raw materials and knows how 
to move the product, so it is a relatively simple transition from authentic to counterfeit  
production.139 
Lastly, although multiple OEMs seems on its face as the best solution to help 
counter the problem of the third-shift it still does not stop an OEM from using what 
information it does have to make counterfeits. For instance, if Apple outsources to an 
OEM in China to make the non-electronic components of an iPhone and outsources to 
Taiwan to make the electronic components of the iPhone, Apple is still disclosing a 
number of intellectual property right abroad. In addition, in the technological world that 
we live in now, most products require assembly in one place. Lastly, the costs of 
essentially splitting production across two different places or even countries may not be 
financially worth it for some companies.  
All of the abovementioned “solutions” are lacking in aspects of feasibility, both 
physically and financially. This Article proposes the solution of a China implemented 
whistleblowing initiative to report third-shift practices. The next section will discuss 
current Chinese whistleblower initiatives as evidence of why third-shift whistleblower 
program might be more effective. 
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: WHISTLEBLOWING PROGRAM FOR 
REPORTING THIRD-SHIFT PRACTICES 
 In order “to solicit the assistance of citizens in law enforcement” China inserts 
into many regulatory rules, provisions that financially reward informants. 140  More 
specifically, “Over the past two decades, the state has established a plethora of laws and 
regulations to sanction illegal practices such as sales of fake products or tax evasion, and 
provides material rewards to those who assist in the law enforcement.”141 The amount of 
the reward is normally calculated in proportion to the reported vio lation. 142  The 
whistleblowing reward is then paid out once a tip is authenticated or a successful 
prosecution results.143 The administrative agency that investigates the whistle blower tip 
is in charge of paying out the reward. 144  Additionally, because some whistleblowing 
“rewards are substantial and noncompliance is rampant in China” there has been an 
emergence of “professional whistleblowers” who engage “full- time in seeking out illegal 
practices and claiming compensations from the violators or rewards from relevant 
government agencies.”145 A closer examination of China’s recent and apparent success 
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with whistleblower initiatives supports this Article’s proposition that implementing a 
whistleblower program can help combat third-shift practices. The Article will first 
discuss China’s corruption whistleblower initiatives. Second, the Article will discuss tax 
whistleblowers.  
Corruption Whistleblowers 
  China’s whistleblower initiative to report political corruption is one of China’s 
most recent and fruitful whistleblower programs. Most corruption whistleblowing in 
China takes place on the Internet, where a wide audience can be reached.146 As such, 
whistleblowing in China has become a frequent phenomenon, with news reports and 
cases of corruption surfacing throughout the country. 147  “According to the Chinese 
Government’s Fourth Working Conference on Whistleblowers in 2008, more than 70 
percent of prosecutions of government officials for corruption were based on 
whistleblower tips.”148  
In 2009, China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the 
Communist party’s anti corruption authority, setup a website for citizens to report 
corruption. 149  Although there are no definitive reports on the number of tips the site 
received, the CCDI claims that from 2008 to 2012 the commission received 301,000 
whistleblowing reports online. 150  In September 2013, the CCDI launched a new 
whistleblowing website to report corruption and to also post official statements on 
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officials being investigated.151 China’s decision to launch the new site came as a response 
to the influx of Chinese citizens taking to social media to expose and criticize 
corruption.152 According to the new site, the Chinese government would legally protect 
whistleblowers from retribution if they report corruption through the site.153  During a 
webcast on the new website, Cui Shaopeng, the secretary general of the CCDI, explicitly 
stated that the commission would “severely deal with revenge attacks.”154 Additionally, 
Cui noted that citizens that file reports using their real name and contact details would be 
given priority. 155  However, the CCDI site also makes clear that “whistle-blowers are 
responsible for the authenticity of their reports” and that reporting false information is a 
crime.156 In terms of compensation for reporting corruption, the award amount tends to 
vary depending on which local Chinese government authority investigates the report.157 
“For example, the AIC of Shandong Province awards small sums of RMB 300 to 1,000 
(approximately USD 50 to 166) for each tip, while the AIC of Yangjiang City in 
Guangdong Province caps rewards at RMB 30,000 (approximately USD 5,000).”158  
Following the launch of the new whistleblowing site, many Chinese citizens 
expressed skepticism on how effective the new anti-corruption scheme would be in 
targeting corruption.159 The main suspicion amongst citizens was that complaints filed 
through the site would be ignored. Additionally citizens feared that corruption 
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whistleblowers would be arrested or attacked.160 Such concerns are not totally without 
merit. Following the launch of the CCDI’s 2009 website, authorities investigated some of 
the online accusations and jailed several low-level officials.161 However, officials at the 
commission refuse to comment on how many reports the 2009 CCDI site actually 
received.162 Following the launch of the CCDI’s 2013 whistleblowing site, Zhu Ruifeng, 
one of China’s most prominent whistleblowers, stated the commission “won’t go after the 
really top corrupt officials.” 163  If this sort of selective targeting exists in the 
implementation of the new whistleblower site, many citizens may choose alternate 
Internet channels for their whistleblowing.  
As of August 2013, there were approximately three dozen Chinese whistleblowers 
that regularly posted reports online about alleged corruption and misconduct. 164  The 
problem with reporting corruption elsewhere on the Internet is that the Chinese 
government will not legally protect such whistleblowers from revenge attacks. As such, 
highly publicized news reports show that Chinese bloggers are increasingly being 
subjected to physical and verbal attacks over their reports of corruption.165 On July, 8, 
2012, blogger and self-styled whistleblower Li Jianxin was stabbed and splashed with 
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acid by two unidentified men.166 Most of Li’s information comes from informants, but 
none of his posts have led to investigations. 167  Li’s use of informants highlights the 
potential of possibly posting false information. In such a case, bloggers like Li would 
have to be weary of more than just physical attacks. On September 9, 2013, China’s top 
court and prosecutor issued a judicial interpretation to crackdown on “online rumors.”168 
According to the judicial interpretation, “people will be charged with defamation if 
online rumors they create are visited by 5,000 internet users or reposted more than 500 
times.”169 Additionally, the judicial interpretation stated that such defamation could lead 
to three years in jail.170  
In sum, recent reports provide evidence that skepticism surrounding the new 
whistleblower site is not unfounded and could lead to potential pitfalls to cracking down 
on corruption. Nevertheless, the potential of the whistleblower site remains apparent. In 
order to further examine whistleblower programs in China, we next turn to tax 
whistleblowers. 
Tax Whistleblowers 
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 Currently, China “rewards tax whistleblowers who contribute to the detention and 
prosecution of tax evasions a portion of the levies and fines subsequently assessed 
(capped at 5% of the deficiency).”171 In addition, “Article 20 of the Administrative  
Rules re Reporting Tax Violations, issued by the national office of the STB, provides that 
tax report centers should notify the informant of the investigation result if he so 
requests.”172 Once a tax whistleblower reports a suspected tax evasion to the local tax 
center the tax center investigates the tip for validity. If the local tax center does not 
investigate the tax whistleblower’s report of possible tax evasion, the tax whistleblower 
can put in additional requests to push the investigation.173 Once a tax evader is prosecuted 
the tax whistleblower receives his reward. Tax whistleblowers also have the ability to file 
a lawsuit to challenge the award.174  
 Like the corruption whistleblower initiative, the tax whistleblower is rather 
organized and sophisticated, and most importantly, it is actually used. Both the corruption 
and tax whistleblower initiatives provide evidence that whistleblower initiatives in China 
have the ability to be successful. In the next section, this Article will discuss the proposed 
solution of a third-shift whistleblower initiative. 
Third-shift Whistleblower Initiative 
                                                 
171 Li, Dare You Sue, supra note 141, at 24 (citing Rules re Awards for Reporting Tax Law Violations (税
务违法案件举报奖励办法), promulgated on July 27, 2005, available at the STB’s official website, 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8192153/n8192242/n8192667/n8194601/8248300.html, last 
checked on August 2, 2012). See Id. at 23-27 (discussing a number of tax whistleblower cases and the 
evolution of the tax whistleblower phenomenon in China). 
172 Li, Dare You Sue, supra note 141, at 24 (citing Administrative Rules re Reporting Tax Violations, 
available at http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136593/n8137537/n8138502/10640001.html, last 
checked on August 23, 2013). 
173 Li, Dare You Sue, supra note 141, at 25 (citing Zhiqiang Huang, Jubao Shangjia Taoshui Jinhuo Yiyuan 
Jiangli (“Reporting of Tax ViolationAwarded One Yuan Only”), Dongfang Zaobao (Sept 24, 2011)).  
174 Li, Dare You Sue, supra note 141. 
 30 
A proposed solution to help combat the third-shift problem is a Chinese 
implemented, and U.S. supported, whistleblowing program that allows the reporting of 
third-shift practices. Inserting whistleblower provisions into China’s IPR laws and 
regulations to reward the reporting a third-shift practices can help expose such 
operations. Then, similar to the CCDI reporting website for corruption, the AIC can 
launch a website that allows for the reporting of third-shift practices. In order to be a 
successful program, the AIC or another IPR related agency would have to extend legal 
protection for informants that report such practices. Protection from retaliation is 
essential because most reporting would arguably be done by an employee of an OEM or 
by someone who knows a person working a third-shift. In addition, in order to encourage 
the whistleblowing, citizens must feel like they are going to be protected from any 
retaliation, be it local government retaliation or from other third-party citizens.  
The pitfalls of a third-shift whistleblower website would be similar to those of the 
CCDI’s website for corruption. One major pitfall would be that the government agency in 
charge with investigating the reports may choose to not investigate certain reports. For 
instance, the government agency may not want to pursue a tip if it would result in loss of 
a number of jobs in a specific region. This sort of selective enforcement could greatly 
hamper the whistleblowing initiative.  
Nevertheless, the third-shift whistleblower program could serve both China and 
American interests. China continues to claim it is interested in cracking down on 
counterfeiting and the launching of the website would make the bold statement that they 
truly are making an effort. Additionally, however, China would have to release official 
reports of investigations and the outcomes of such investigations via the respective 
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government agency website. For third-shift whistleblower reports that yield successful 
results, the reward should be based of a percentage of the actual damages the IPR owner 
sustained. For example, a possible reward could be five percent of the total profit that 
was diverted from the IPR owner to the third-shift good producer.175 
CONCLUSION 
 The first step in solving the problem of the third-shift is for both China and the 
United States to admit that they have and had a problem. Once China and the United 
States accept the problem they will be better equipped to start combatting it. All 
counterfeit products pose threats to both consumers and companies alike. Third-shift 
counterfeiting is essentially counterfeiting “right under the nose” and as such it should be 
the first kind of counterfeiting addressed by companies. By launching a third-shift 
whistleblowing site, the United States and China will be taking a bold stand against 
counterfeits. 
   


















                                                 
 
